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Introduction
Who interacts with whom in local taxation? Local governments have several motives to set tax rates with respect to neighboring jurisdictions. In particular, local tax choices of neighboring jurisdictions might be a subject of competition for mobile tax bases, a benchmark or even a learning device for local politicians. However, it is not clear to whom local politicians refer in their tax policies, i.e. who are their eective neighbors for local tax mimicking. In particular, we investigate which channels particularly matter local tax interactions, for e.g. we ask whether institutional proximity intensies interactions compared to pure geographical distance. Understanding the exact nature of local tax interactions is important for the implications of the spatial distribution of income in the long run. Moreover, a benevolent social planner should harmonize taxes if local tax interactions are motivated by a harmful competition over mobile resources in a race to the bottom style and rather follow a laissez-faire policy if taxes rate strategies are communicated between local governments and no tax base eects are present.
Traditional empirical studies on tax rate interactions typically dene neighbors as a (weighted) average of neighboring jurisdictions. 1 . However, local governments in most federations are strongly interrelated with respect to the institutions they share both horizontally (e.g. joint administration bodies like courts or tax oces) and vertically, for example in overlapping jurisdictions like counties and municipalities. Therefore, local politicians might have dierent social or professional ties to other local decision makers.
Based on this, tax interactions might be stronger in settings where local politicians or bureaucrats interact more intensely with each other rather than only with geographically close jurisdictions. Our contribution is to provide evidence on the importance of several coordination channels for tax interactions. In particular, we intend to show that local institutions and media via an inherent information transfer might be more important than pure geographical criteria for the signicance of local tax interactions.
We use detailed geocoded data from local networks of institutions and media coverage to construct neighbor matrices consisting of municipalities sharing the same institutions as well as geographically close municipalities to identify local tax interactions. Weighting matrices usually assign the average values of the neighboring tax rates, which are 1 Geographical distance is either measured by the adjacency of neighbors, the N nearest number of neighbors or the inverse distance between two jurisdictions. See Revelli (2005) for a review. 1 in our setting institutional or geographical neighbors. Our setting is particularly interesting as potential vertical externalities from higher tier institutions which are shared with other local governments are unlikely as we focus on institutions with no own tax autonomy rights. Therefore, institutions function as a coordination device of political actions and not as a competitor for local tax bases. Using this we are able to separate the coordination eect of institutions from their potentially depriving eects on common tax bases. Moreover, NRW is interesting for institutional coordination eects as it is described as the most professionalized state in Germany regarding local political decision making (Arnold, Boettcher, Freier, Geiÿler, and Holler, 2015) .
To identify local tax mimicking, we use a policy reform of local scal equalization in the German state of NRW as a quasi-experimental setting that created an incentive for municipalities to increase their tax rates. We construct an instrumental variable that predicts reform incentives to increase tax rates for neighboring municipalities by constructing the so called predicted imposed increase in tax rates (Lyytikäinen, 2012) .
Using this policy reform in the commonly applied spatial lag IV estimation, we yield three main ndings for business tax rates in NRW.
Using counties as our baseline weighting matrix, rst, we nd, positive signicant tax rate interactions. Moreover, shared administration services and common access to local media yield similar results. However, interactions with geographical neighbors are not signicant in our setting which contrasts most of the traditional literature. Unlike geographical neighbors, political and social proximity might be asymmetric in distance and adjacency.
Even though geographical neighbors are more likely to be in the same institution, political and social proximity weights might be asymmetric in distance and adjacency to their geographical counterparts, for e.g. with neighboring municipalities in dierent counties or across intermunicipal cooperations. Therefore, we nd that some institutions indeed elevate tax rate interactions when there are in fact no interactions over geographical distance.
Second, there are positive and signicant tax interactions during the reform. However, signicant eects phase out already two years after the reform. Therefore, tax interactions are not a general phenomenon but only reform-induced in the present study. 2 2 Changes in tax rates are often only triggered by reforms of local scal equalization (Baskaran, 2014) , changes in minimum tax rates (Lyytikäinen, 2012) , integration of new regions into a federation (Baskaran, 2015b) or election dates (Foremny and Riedel, 2014) .
Third, we nd suggestive evidence for local tax interactions via social learning processes through institutions and common local media. Several reasons provide evidence for a learning process. For instance, tax interactions are short-lived, which provides supportive evidence for a one-time learning process rather than continuous tax interactions. In addition, interaction is strongest when common institutions are considered as a neighbor framework. In fact, institutions where local politicians and bureaucrats can be thought to be the most interactive with each other, namely within the same county and the same administrations. Therefore, counties, joint administrations as well as local media are eective coordination mechanisms for local tax policies during the reform. However, other channels like inter-municipal cooperation in individual projects or regional marketing and tourism as well as interest group coverage do not intensify tax interactions.
We also argue that other forms of tax mimicking are unlikely in our setting.
3 We rule out tax rate interactions via tax competition due to the absence of tax base eects of neighboring tax rate changes during the reform, interactions through institutions being stronger than geographical criteria and the short term adjustment during the reform.
Additionally, we rule out yardstick competition because it implies that municipalities with majorities have less intensely interactions than those without. We do not nd evidence for this. Moreover, a subtle change in local scal equalization might also not be visible or important to voters even though the impact on local tax rates is strong.
Although we nd media to be an important transmission channel for local tax interactions (Revelli, 2008) , there seems to be no voter eect of local media but rather a coordination of local decision makers via media over issues like local tax policies. Furthermore, benet spillovers are unlikely in the present context as there is no negative interaction eect.
Our ndings are consistent with recent quasi-experimental evidence that local tax rate interactions are not a general phenomenon (Baskaran, 2014; Lyytikäinen, 2012; Isen, 2014; Eugster and Parchet, 2011) . 4 In particular, we show that there are signicant tax rate interactions but that they are only short-lived and not relevant in the common 3 See Section 2 for a detailed overview of theoretical motives on local tax interactions. 4 Agrawal (2015a) nds horizontal and vertical interactions via local sales tax rates for states in the US by taking state border discontinuities into account. Agrawal (2015b) exploits state border discontinuities to show interaction among local sales tax rates at state borders. Eugster and Parchet (2011) nd small scale tax competition eects of the local income tax in Switzerland along cultural borders. Parchet (2012) nds that personal income tax rates are strategic substitutes in Switzerland. Holzmann and Schwerin (2015) nd tax rate interactions in a highly integrated economic area. (Traditional) studies not using quasi-experimental methods to identify tax rate interactions also nd strong tax rate interactions; for a survey see Allers and Elhorst (2005) . adjacent neighbor denitions but rather arise within certain channels.
We contribute to the literature on who competes with whom in tax policy. We explicitly distinguish institutional and geographical distance using detailed information on dierent local institutions, for example administration and cooperation, media, and standard geographical criteria. Hence, we are among the rst to show that institutions also matter in local tax interactions. Revelli (2003) and Agrawal (2015a) , however, show that vertical interactions matter in local taxation for British and US local governments, respectively.
We nd evidence for the relevance of counties for interactions of local scal policy in a multi-tier federation (Borck, Fossen, Freier, and Martin, 2015; Agrawal, 2015a; Buettner, 2001; Büttner and von Schwerin, forthcoming) .
Moreover, we add to a small literature which denes factors that determine tax interactions like cultural borders (Eugster and Parchet, 2011), integration of economic areas (Holzmann and Schwerin, 2015; Baskaran, 2014) or regions (Baskaran, 2015b) , metropolitan areas versus periphery (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Kauder, 2014; Charlot and Paty, 2010; Koh, Riedel, and Böhm, 2013) , and borders for both states (Geys and Osterloh, 2013; Cassette, Porto, and Foremny, 2012; Baskaran, 2014; Agrawal, 2015b) or nations (Cassette, Porto, and Foremny, 2012) , respectively.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe several motives for local tax interactions. Section 3 outlines the institutional framework, most notably the system of local scal equalization of NRW and its reform in 2003. Section 4 and 5 describe the empirical approach and results, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2
Theoretical motives for local tax interactions Local governments can have several motives to interact in tax rates. An important one is certainly discussed in the tax competition literature, where local jurisdictions try to attract a mobile capital tax base by setting lower tax rates (Wilson, 1999; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) . Tax rates become interdependent as the tax reduction of one jurisdiction lets others experience a scal externality in form of an outow of capital. In 5 Moreover, Reiter (2015) provides a survey on the question of who competes with whom in international tax competition. In a centre-periphery framework, Janeba and Osterloh (2013) show that metropolitan and rural jurisdictions compete sequentially over mobile tax bases. a symmetric setting, tax competition results in a harmful race to the bottom. However, asymmetries in the assumptions of the model can make the sign of tax interdependence ambiguous. Secondly, jurisdictions might experience informational spillovers in tax choices when comparing themselves to neighboring units as yardsticks (Besley and Case, 1995) . Here, voters can use tax rates of other municipalities ceteris paribus as a benchmark to determine how successful the respective incumbent is and accordingly, either punish or reward him at the polls. Thus, in order to get re-elected local politicians might mimic tax choices of neighboring places. Therefore, one would expect positive tax interactions in the presence of yardstick competition. However, a prominent reason for negative tax interactions are benet spillovers (Case, Rosen, and Hines, 1993) . The idea is that local public goods provision in a given municipality entails positive externalities in other units due to the non-excludable character of quasi-public club goods. Hence, spending needs of the neighboring jurisdictions are lower and allow for lower tax rates.
Beside these traditional theories of local tax interactions, the literature has recently discussed other transmission channels of tax rate mimicking. Potentially relevant to our setting are especially interactions through social learning or (partial) tax coordination.
For instance, Glick (2014) sets up a model where social learning can overcome situations with substantial uncertainty about policy outcomes such as policy reforms. Thus, learning from others' tax choices with limited information of policy makers on the consequences of one's own tax rate decisions can be ecient. Accordingly, tax mimicking should constitute a positive sign if social learning or knowledge diusion is present. Moreover, Becker and Davies (2013) show that tax mimicking via social learning is lower if adjustment costs are present. For example intensive communication of local governments might lower adjustment costs between policy makers and can elevate tax interactions.
There are also incentives to coordinate local tax choices as competing over a mobile tax base might lead to an inecient underprovision of public goods. Whereas most of the literature discusses diculties of jurisdictions to coordinate their tax choices (Keen and Konrad, 2012), we believe that multi-tier federations like Germany indeed oer scenarios in which coordination might be eective. For instance, institutions (like counties) and joint administration (bureaucracy) shared by multiple municipalities might provide a platform for knowledge diusion with respect to tax strategies or even actively provide guidelines for setting tax rates. Given coordination, one would expect perfect harmonization of tax rates within that specic area of coordination. In the presence of asymmetries 5 of regions, however, one would not expect identical tax rates as some municipalities might be harmed by coordination (Kanbur and Keen, 1993) . However, strong institutions like counties might potentially initiate coordination if their members are suciently similar.
Partial tax coordination takes place in similar regions if tax competition takes place repeatedly (Cardarelli, Taugourdeau, and Vidal, 2002; Cotenaro and Vidal, 2006) . With partial coordination, groups of similar jurisdictions compete over resources with other regions and yield harmonized tax rates just as with with social learning. For example, jurisdictions belonging to the same county or particularly similar or close neighborhoods within the same county might entail sucient homogeneity of municipalities for partial tax coordination to take place. Note that partial coordination implies a scal externality (between similar regions) unlike tax harmonization or social learning.
Institutions

Local governments and public bodies in Germany
In the present paper we want to show the relevance of learning across dierent institutions for local tax interactions in the German federal state of NRW. German local governments display a high degree of fragmentation and heterogeneity. Generally one can distinguish jurisdictions and non-jurisdictional bodies, each with substantial dierences in terms of autonomy and accountability. For a detailed overview of the German local government system, see Zimmermann (1999) . 6 disposal, and culture activities. However, municipalities also share duties with other jurisdictions, for example with counties or other municipalities, or even with private rms.
Municipalities have substantial spending and also some revenue autonomy (see Section 3.2). Counties, however, cooperate with municipalities in service provision. They do not have tax autonomy and rely largely on contributions and grants.
Non-jurisdictional bodies are not legitimated by elections and also do not possess revenue autonomy, i.e. they do not have taxation rights. NRW for instance, has semi-autonomous bodies like regional districts (Regierungsbezirke ), which are administrative districts of the state government, and various general or single purpose inter-municipal cooperations.
Cooperations in administration or local economy issues are initiated locally and represent horizontal cooperation. They usually serve to exploit economies of scale or increase bargaining power in political issues. Regional districts, however, follow a classical topdown model of bureaucracy and are a typical example of local institutions which do not pass legislation but implement arm's length decisions from the state.
In this study, we exploit information on institutions which could either elevate horizontal or vertical tax interactions at the municipal level. Vertical tax interactions refer to the coordination of tax policies by (or passively in the area of ) a higher tier of government, for example within a county or regional district. Jurisdictions might also interact horizontally with other units from the same tier, for example between municipalities. Local governments might also be inuenced by non-governmental interest groups. Economic, political or cultural associations might lobby for certain policies at the local level.
Local business taxation
Municipalities can set the tax rate for the business and property tax autonomously. In fact, the business tax (Gewerbesteuer ) is the most important source of local revenues under own discretion in Germany. Municipalities in NRW earn on average 18-24% of their overall revenues from business taxes. Note that the municipalities can only levy a business tax multiplier τ i , but as it is applied to the respective tax base B i with a percental surcharge which is xed throughout the federation (S), the tax multiplier actually represents the eective tax rate 7 : 7 Therefore, we use the terms tax rate and tax rate multiplier interchangeably.
where T i is the business tax revenue of a given municipality i. The surcharge S (Steuermesszahl ) is xed and equals 3.5% since a corporate tax reform in 2008 (Büttner, Schefer, and von Schwerin, 2014) . 8 Business taxes are levied by a municipality on all rms located in that municipality. The respective tax base is the rms' net prots (Gewerbeertrag), although there are some exceptions. 9 .
Municipalities can also tax housing and land property within their borders. The tax base is the assessed value determined by the respective local tax oce. There are separate property taxes for agricultural (Grundsteuer A) and both residential and commercial usage (Grundsteuer B). Overall, property taxation is less important to German municipalities than income from business tax. Note that we focus in the following on the business tax.
However, municipalities also receive income from taxes which are shared vertically across governmental tiers (Gemeinschaftssteuern ). Note that shared income taxes and VAT income accounted for about 19.34% and 1.84% of municipal revenues in NRW, respectively.
Although municipalities receive certain shares of tax revenues from related economic activities within their borders, they do not possess tax autonomy on these taxes.
Local scal equalization and its reform in 2003
The present paper exploits a reform in local scal equalization in NRW in 2003 to study its eect on local tax interactions and related transmission channels. Indeed, the single most important source of local revenues are transfers from the state government, provided within a local scal equalization scheme. They account for about 50% of overall 8 Before, the surcharge depended on the business type of the rm with incorporated and most non-incorporated rms facing a 5% surcharge rate. Non-incorporated companies like private business partnerships faced a maximum rate of 5% when taxable income for business tax exceeded 48,000 euro and a minimum rate of 1% when earnings were below 12,000 euro. 9 For instance, local business tax payments can be deducted from either personal income or corporate income tax, for non-incorporated and incorporated companies, respectively (Büttner, Scheer, and von Schwerin, 2014) 8 municipal revenues in NRW. Whereas grants can be either discretionary 10 or rule-based (Schlüsselzuweisungen ), the latter are within the focus of this paper as they are economically more important and are also subject to our natural experiment.
Rule-based transfers from the federal state target on giving municipalities sucient funds to provide local public goods in an sucient quantity and quality. Fiscal equalization mainly intends to balance out dierences in municipal scal need and scal capacity according to some formula apportionment. First, scal need is some benchmark level of (obligatory) spending per inhabitant to meet citizen's needs. Second, scal capacity, however, is a measure of the municipal ability to nance these spending needs.
11
Specically, the rule-based transfers per capita g i,t from the federal state are distributed to the i = 1, ..., N in order to reduce the dierence between the scal need n i,t and the scal capacity c i,t in a given year t. This scal equalization reads as follows
with 0.9 being the equalization rate in our sample period. Therefore, municipalities with lower scal capacity than scal need will receive 90% of that scal gap from state equalization transfers. With scal capacity at least as high as the respective need, the municipality does not receive rule-based transfers at all (i.e. it is scally abundant).
Fiscal need n i,t is a standardized amount of spending xed by the state government (Grundbetrag ) in the previous scal year to avoid manipulations of the assumed costs of service provision. It is also determined by municipality-specic characteristics, mostly by population size. Whereas all localities should receive similar revenues per capita, more populous regions have disproportionately higher scal needs to compensate for assumed higher costs of public goods provision with increasing population size (Brecht, 1932) .
12
The reform of scal equalization in 2003 leaves scal need unaected but changes a parameter referring to the scal capacity. Fiscal capacity is dened as the sum of tax 10 Discretionary or purpose-related grants (Zweckzuweisungen) are occasional transfers from the state-government to municipalities and are paid in form of matching grants for which municipalities have to apply. Frequently granted transfers are for example infrastructure projects. 11 For details on local scal equalization in German federal states, see Lenk and Rudolph (2004) . 12 However, also other factors like municipal centrality or the number of school children matter (GFAG NRW, several years). revenues from all tax bases, i.e. from autonomously set taxes and vertically shared taxes with no autonomy, such as VAT or federal income tax. Specically, it is given by:
where c i,t is the scal capacity in the current year, T i,m,t−1 the tax revenues for m which denotes the three local taxes (business tax, property tax A and B) whose tax multipliers municipalities are free to set as well as vertically shared tax revenues T shared,t−1 from the previous year 13 . Each tax base m is divided by actual tax rates τ i,m,t−1 from the previous year, respectively. Moreover, the latter term is multiplied with the so called hypothetical tax rate τ t,m (ktiver Hebesatz ), which is set by the state government and is constant across municipalities.
The transfer system aims at providing sucient equality in relative scal power but also does not want municipalities to rely strategically on transfer payments. Municipalities should also engage in tax competition and therefore, the focus of scal capacity is shifted from actual to potential revenues. In particular, revenues are normalized by dividing actual revenues with tax multipliers and are then multiplied with a statewide reference rate, i.e. the hypothetical tax rate. This procedure makes transfer payments independent of actual tax revenues (and hence, actual tax multipliers) but instead relying on eective tax capacity. This procedure prevents the state to perceive low-tax municipalities as scally weak via mechanically lower tax revenues and vice versa for high-tax jurisdictions.
Therefore, the hypothetical tax rate should have no direct eect on transfer payments and therefore, on actual tax rates. However, actual tax rates respond strongly and increase as a response to an increase in the hypothetical rate in 2003 as will be shown below.
The state government of NRW increased the hypothetical multiplier for the business tax from 380 to 403%. The same applied to the reform of hypothetical property tax rates.
NRW changes hypothetical tax rates occasionally and usually in large steps. Changes occur when the hypothetical multiplier does not align with the (weighted) population average of recent realized tax rates (Ministry of Interior NRW, 2010;Lenk and Rudolph (2004)). Therefore, one might argue that some cities with large tax bases might be 13 More precisely, the tax multipliers and revenues applied in the formula apportionment use gures from July two years ago and June 30th of last year. For instance, scal capacity in 2003 is calculated from tax revenues between July 1st 2001 and June 30th, 2002 (GFAG NRW, 2003 .
important drivers of the level of the hypothetical tax rate. For small municipalities which cannot individually inuence the weighted average of tax rates, the policy change is arguably exogenous. Nonetheless, we also show later that our ndings are robust to dierent population classes and several placebo reforms in pre-reform years. Moreover, changes in hypothetical tax rates by the state government are irregular and come only with little prior notice. Therefore, the timing of these reforms is hardly predictable, especially from the viewpoint of an individual municipality. 14 The reform should also increase municipalities' tax eort and incentivizes them to rely less on scal grants.
Hypothetical tax rates are essentially a normalization of tax bases and there should be no direct negative eects on transfers in equ. (2) (NRW GFAG, 2002 , 2003 .
Therefore, scal need had to decrease proportionately per capita as the scal capacity increased but total transfers were constant. Second, the scal gap could actually change via an increase in the hypothetical multiplier but these eects on relative distribution on transfers were minor. 15 Thus, the increase in the hypothetical multiplier should not have substantial eects on rule-based transfer payments and therefore on actual tax rates.
However, the hypothetical tax rate is a strong reference rate for actual business tax multipliers. Figure 1 shows the development of average tax rates and hypothetical tax rates over time. Note that the increase in the hypothetical tax rate in 2003 led to an accompanying increase in the average business tax rate in the following years. On average, the business tax rates are always signicantly above the hypothetical tax rates and indeed most municipalities choose a tax rate which is at least as high as the hypothetical multiplier. Moreover, the number of municipalities with tax rate changes per year increased in 2003 substantially up to 250 out of 396. Several reasons may account for this. First, the hypothetical tax rate punishes eorts to attract a mobile tax base because a higher multiplier implies that larger tax bases reduce transfers received in equ. (2). Thus, own tax eorts are diminished by higher hypothetical tax rates and thus imply higher tax rates. Fiscal equalization schemes are shown to have such eects on local tax rates both theoretically and empirically (Kelders and Koethenbuerger, 2010; Egger, Köthenbürger, and Smart, 2010; Büttner, 2006) . Holzmann and Schwerin (2015) argue that tax rates are not set too low for another reason. Often, federal states in Germany make it a condition for municipalities applying for a discretionary grant to make a sucient tax eort themselves. Therefore, if tax rates are too low municipalities might have less of a chance to receive task-related grants from the state government. Hence, municipalities should not set their tax rates too low below the hypothetical tax rate which is essentially a tax rate of which the state government thinks that municipalities can tax appropriately.
Second, political economy considerations might play a role. When increasing the hypothetical tax rate the state government might lower the political costs of own tax increases by local policy-makers. They can use the veil of the state-wide tax increase to hide increases in their own tax rates. Parts of the tax increase can be attributed to the state government to avoid the loss of voter support. Moreover, Baskaran (2014) argues that hypothetical tax rates are means for rms lobbying for lower tax rates in municipalities if actual tax rates exceed this reference rate. Hypothetical tax rates are also important because of the common misbeliefs of local politicians and the local media that even a tax rate that is negligibly lower than the hypothetical rate leads ceteris paribus to direct losses in rule-based transfer payments (DIHK, 2009 ). However, scal capacity and therefore transfer payments are ceteris paribus independent from actual tax rates. Therefore, politicians of municipalities below the reference rate might increase the respective actual tax rate due to an increase in the hypothetical tax rate, even though no direct negative eects on grant allocation are to be expected without it. This establishes a ratchet-eect,
where the actual tax rate should be at least as high as the hypothetical rate.
Methodology
Spatial lag models
This paper estimates municipal tax reactions to a change of neighboring municipalities' tax rates. A common procedure to address this question is the spatial lag model, which explicitly incorporates neighbor outcomes into the regression. The standard model is estimated as follows:
where τ i,t is the tax rate from municipality i in year t and τ j,t represents the averaged tax rates of all neighbor municipalities j of municipality i in period t. Moreover, signicant estimates of ρ are interpreted as strategic tax rate interactions with neighbors. We also include x i,t as control variables, µ i as municipality xed eects and the error term i,t .
The spatial weighting matrix w i,j assigns the averaged tax rates of a pre-dened set of neighbors. Averaging via row normalization ensures the stability of the estimator. Note that the true weighting matrix is unknown. Traditionally, weighting matrices are either based on common borders, distances or population weights. Generally, adjacent units or close municipalities are assumed to have stronger interactions.
However, policy interactions might not only be triggered by geographical closeness but also by political or social ties. To separate distinct channels of tax interactions, we 13 also introduce several weighting matrices for institutional or local media networks in addition to standard geographical weights. For instance, county membership (County ) of municipalities is an important institutional network. Moreover, we use rich institutional data from Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) and Terfrüchte (2015) to construct our institutional weights. We assign neighbors based on joint access to local media (Media ), administration (Administrative ), municipal cooperation projects (Cooperation ), cooperation in regional marketing and tourism (Regional marketing) and interest groups for social and economic issues (Social and economic). The denitions from Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) follow a heuristic approach and aim to resemble given borders. The same institutional weighting matrices are also proposed by Terfrüchte (2015), using the regional correlation of local institutions to assign the resp borders. 16
In the baseline regressions we consider all municipalities in the same county as neighbors because of a superior model t compared to other weighting matrices (for related Akaike and Schwartz criteria, see Table 2 ) and due to the expected interactions within counties 17 .
Taking rst dierences of equ. (4) removes the municipality xed eect µ i and gives:
Specically, equ. (5) measures whether the change in the weighted average of neighboring business tax rates aects the change in the business tax rates of a given municipality.
However, the neighboring tax changes ∆ j =i w i,j τ j,t might be biased due to several sources of endogeneity. First, there is the issue of reverse causality, i.e. whether a municipality's tax rates inuence neighbors tax rates or vice versa. Second, unobserved shocks during the reform might inuence tax rates of a certain municipality and its neighbors jointly.
For instance, this might be an exogenous reform that increases tax rates (like in our setting) or spatially correlated macro shocks aecting both the tax base and tax rates.
16 For detailed descriptions of non-geographic weighting matrices, see Appendix C and (2009) is shown in Figure B .2 of Appendix B and the mapping of the institutions using a functional approach based on Terfrüchte (2015) is show in Figure B .1 of Appendix B. 17 We discuss the role of various institutional and geography-based weighting matrices for local tax interactions in Section 5.4.
There are several ways to deal with this endogeneity problem. Traditional spatial lag IV regressions instrument the weighted average of neighboring tax rates with socioeconomic or political characteristics of the neighboring municipalities. However, it is unlikely that this solves potential endogeneity concerns (Gibbons and Overman, 2012). 18 First, municipal tax rates might not be well predicted by neighboring control variables because the weighting matrix might misspecify the exact inuence of neighbor characteristics on neighboring tax rates. Second, observable neighboring control variables might have a direct signicant eect on the tax rates as well. Moreover, there might be omitted variables that inuence both the neighboring characteristics and the error term i,t .
However, recent quasi-experimental literature used exogenous variation from policy changes to identify causal tax rate reactions at the local level. Accordingly, the next subsection will propose an instrumental variable strategy based on a policy change in NRW to take the endogeneity problem in the common spatial lag framework into account. 19
Identication using an exogenous policy change
We use the 2003 reform in NRW to identify reactions towards neighboring tax changes using the empirical method of Lyytikäinen (2012). This paper exploits exogenous variation from a country-wide statutory property tax increase in Finland as a natural experiment to identify tax mimicking behavior at local level. Unlike the Finish setting, we do not have a strictly binding minimum tax rate for business tax in NRW but municipalities have nevertheless strong incentives to increase tax rates as a response to the increase in the hypothetical tax rate. Hence, we believe that our instrument is relevant.
To capture the incentive to increase tax rates as a response to increased hypothetical tax rate we calculate the predicted imposed tax increase as we cannot observe the counterfactual of tax rate choices without the increase in the hypothetical rate. The update of the hypothetical tax rate is an arguably exogenous event and hence we can use the neighboring imposed increase to predict neighboring tax changes. In other words, we instrument tax rate choices of a municipality's neighbors with their incentives to increase tax rates.
18 Another method in traditional spatial econometrics is quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimation (LeSage and Pace, 2009). The underlying assumption with QML is that the true spatial interaction is known, which is a strong assumption (Gibbons and Overman, 2012). 19 We report results of traditional Spatial IV estimations in the robustness checks in Section 3.
15 Therefore, we propose the calculation of neighbors' predicted imposed increases from the reform in the rst stage as follows:
The This is because of the widely observed incentive of municipalities to perceive the hypothetical tax rate as a minimum value for their own tax rate choices. Moreover, except for one municipality all tax rate changes are positive. The previous discussion on municipal incentives to use the hypothetical tax rate as a benchmark for own tax rate choices and therefore, incentives to increase tax rates as a response to the reform in 2003, indicates how strongly our instrument predicts tax rate increases after the reform. Moreover, Figure 2 shows some preliminary evidence on the correlation of the predicted imposed increase with actual tax increases due to the reform. In fact, there is a positive correlation between these variables and thus, our instrument strongly predicts tax increases from 2002 to 2003.
Note that tax rates of municipalities are spatially correlated and hence, so are the pre- By including the predicted imposed increase for a given municpality i as well we control for the direct reform eect on this municipality. Hence, we can avoid endogeneity through the overall incentive of the reform to increase tax rates and the related issue of spatial autocorrelation from neighbors tax rates to own tax increases. Conditional on the own imposed increase in a given municipality, we can measure the causal eect of tax rate interactions of a given municipality to its neighbors in response to the tax reform.
Results
Data and descriptive statistics
We use a balanced panel for all 396 municipalities of NRW from 1993-2008. In the baseline IV regressions we only exploit data from 2000 onwards as all identifying variation for our instrument is from this period. In Section 3 we also perform placebo tests using of all municipalities change their tax rates. The change is 13.6 percentage points on average although it ranges from -2 to 70 percentage points. Grants also vary greatly across municipalities with a range from 0 to more than 600 euro per capita. NRW is also a highly urbanized state with comparably high municipal debt levels.
Moreover, the left panel of Figure 3 shows 
Baseline results
The main results using municipalities in the same county as neighbors are displayed in Table 1 . Model I gives the second stage results as depicted in equ. (5) and Model II shows the rst stage results using the instrument as outlined in equ. (6). Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights. Neighboring tax rates are instrumented with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Stars indicate signicance levels at 1% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
Our policy change-based instrument proves to be a relevant instrument in the rst stage in Model II. The Kleibergen-Paap F-test of about 190 in the rst stage indicates the strong predictive power of our instrumental variable. Moreover, the neighboring imposed increase indicates the relevance of our instrument in statistical and economic means. 22
These ndings show that municipalities indeed respond strongly to the incentive caused by the increase in the hypothetical tax rate as outlined in Section 3.3.
The second stage shows that the spatial interaction eect is positive and signicant.
Therefore, municipalities seem to have reacted strategically to neighboring municipalities in their own county regarding their tax rate choices after the reform. An increase in one SD of the neighbors tax increase results in a substantial increase in the own tax rate by 20% (0.314 × 7.760)/12.822). Moreover, the inuence of the predicted imposed tax increase is 48.028 % of the SD.
23 Both eects allow for an interesting comparison because we can determine the degree of a direct response to the reform and to the response of neighboring decisions. Since the eect of 'own imposed increase' is larger than the neighboring interaction eect, we infer that politicians foremost respond to the policy change. This is an interesting result, since tax mimicking is mainly driven by the reform but is done only residually after adjusting ones' own tax rate to the policy change.
We also re-estimate our baseline model for various weighting matrices of both geographical and non-geographical nature. We present the most interesting results in Table 2 and a detailed overview of the results in Cooperation in regional tourism and interest groups for political and societal issues are not signicant either. Table A .3 in Appendix A shows the robustness of selected institutional networks for local tax interactions. The disaggregated measure of common access to local media yields robust results. Joint administrations also appear widely robust but fail one placebo test in the pre-reform period.
We proceed with extensive robustness tests for the county matrix as our baseline weighting scheme and discuss the implications of dierent institutional matrices in Section 5.4.
23 Using the SD of the dummy 'Non-zero own imposed increase (1/0)' (46.64 %) and the SD of own imposed increase (17.65), the eect on SD of the own tax increase is 48.03%. ((6.403 × 0.4664) + ((17.647 × 0.176)/12.687). Notes: All presented matrices are row normalized. Control variables are the long dierences of the population, the share young (<15yrs.) and old (>65yrs.), employed per capita, core budget debt per capita and short term debt per capita. Neighboring tax rates are instrumented with neighboring predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. Furthermore, we also include the own imposed increase based on the year 2000 as well as a dummy whether own imposed increase is unequal to zero.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate signicance levels at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
Robustness tests
For the reform to be arguably exogenous, own tax decisions during the reform should not be inuenced by neighbors' tax decisions prior to the reform. We test this prediction with several placebo tests in Table 3 . In Model I-III we regress the predicted tax changes of neighboring municipalities from 2002 to 2003 on tax changes in a municipality of years preceding the reform. In Model IV, we assigned a municipality to an arbitrary county.
We do this by assigning a given municipality to all other municipalities in a county with the next higher county identier number. This ensures that each county is only assigned once. Alternatively, we use historical county borders from 1960 as an additional placebo test in Model V to show the exogeneity of county borders.
County borders in West
German states changed in an extensive wave of county and municipal merger reforms in the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, most county borders of today do not overlap with historical borders. If tax interactions between municipalities were biased by spatial autocorrelation of tax rates, tax rates should also be correlated across historical borders. If in fact today's institutions mattered for current tax decisions, interactions should be insignicant.
Note that throughout all specications and years our instrument proves to be a strong predictor of neighboring tax rate changes. Regarding the robustness tests of Model I-III, the interaction eect of current neighboring tax changes on past tax changes is insignicant. This shows that our instrument signicantly predicts the actual reform but is not correlated via the error terms with earlier decisions. We also run placebo regressions 25 The number of municipalities and counties decreased from 2365 to 396 and and from 57 to 30, respectively. There were more district-free cities, which results in 38 units without neighbors in our sample. For simplicity, we assume them to be each others' neighbors. However, dropping these observations does not change the results. 21 Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights in Models I-III.
Model IV assigns municipalities form the county with the next higher county identier as neighbors. Model V assigns municipalities based on the same county prior to the county mergers in 1960. Neighboring tax rates are instrumented in all models with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. Control variables are the same as in Table 1 where we gradually drop municipalities with more than 150,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.
Results do not change qualitatively and show that large municipalities do not drive the eects of the reform. In addition, an insignicant interaction eect in Model IV indicates that the municipal decision to increase tax rates solely depends on its own county. In Model V we do not nd signicant eects which shows that not geographical proximity but current institutions of the county matter for local tax interactions. Counties seem to eectively coordinate contemporary tax policies at the local level.
We conduct further robustness checks in Table A .4 in Appendix A. Here, we omit control variables, cluster on the county level, include dierent regional dummies to account for regional heterogeneity and added accumulated contributions per county (Kreisumlage ) as a control. Since our coecient of interest does not dier much when excluding control variables in Model II, unobservable variation should not aect our variable of interest and we have suggestive evidence that our instrument is in fact exogenous (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005) .
26 When clustering on the county level in Model III, the interaction eect remains signicant. The addition of regional variables in row IV and V and county grants in row VI also do not change our ndings qualitatively. Note that Model IV and Model V show that our results are not only accrue to a metropolitan area (Holzmann and Schwerin, 2015) or specic to a certain regional district, respectively. Moreover, we can show that contributions to the county are insignicant in Model VI (not reported) 26 Note that we keep the dummy's 'Non-zero own imposed tax increase' and 'Own increase' in our set of control variables as we only introduce exogeneity with our IV conditional on own incentives to increase the tax rates and avoid issues of spatial autocorrelation (Lyytikäinen, 2012) . When omitting these factors tax interactions become highly overestimated. and thus, we can rule out the presence of vertical externalities Revelli (2003) .
27
We also compare our results to traditional estimates of tax interactions. Traditional IV estimates use neighbors characteristics as instruments for neighbors tax rates. Results are displayed in Table A .5 in Appendix A. F-statistics are much lower compared to our policy-change based instrument but are still nonweak by conventional standards. Both traditional spatial lag models and QML estimations yield tax interactions of higher signicance and magnitude than our baseline model. In line with recent quasi-experimental literature on local tax interactions, our ndings cast some doubt on the validity of traditional instruments (Gibbons and Overman, 2012).
Discussion
Social learning and institutions
In Section 2 we argued that social learning is a likely motive for tax mimicking during the reform in question. Here, we present suggestive evidence to support this notion.
Social learning is needed as individual municipalities or local politicians in particular are unlikely to be successful in predicting the outcomes, for example future grant allocation, as a result of the reform. This holds particularly for a reform of the complex grant system of local scal equalization in NRW. Instead, local politicians and bureaucrats need to communicate tax strategies to resolve the inherent uncertainty of the reform.
Moreover, social learning during the reform should be a one-step learning process rather than a continuous process as new information has to be communicated only once. In fact, we nd supportive evidence for this in Table 4 , where tax interactions become insignicant two years after the reform and eects disappear gradually. The sharp drop of the eect from 2007-2008 might reect a federal reform of the business tax. 28 27 As a further exercise, we interacted tax interactions in dierent regressions with municipalities under scal supervision and municipalities that do not receive rule grants (i.e. are abundant). Tax interactions always remains signicant but abundant and scally supervised municipalities, respectively do not react to their neighbors during the reform. The results are available from the authors upon request.
The structure of tax interaction intensity provides another argument for social learning. Tax policies should be communicated on platforms where politicians or bureaucrats are likely to meet such as the county parliament or joint administration oces. Also local media might be an eective means of knowledge spillovers for tax policies. Other institutional cooperations such as inter-municipal cooperation for individual projects, cooperation in tourism or regional marketing or interaction with local interest groups are, however, less reasonable channels of information for local tax policies. Accordingly, we only nd signicant interactions within similar institutions and media as shown in Table   A .2 in Appendix A, but not for neighbors measured by geographical distance only. This leads us to the conclusion, that we indeed observe social learning through the reform as reform outcomes are hard to predict for individual municipalities and coordination via counties, media and within bureaucracies is a feasible coping mechanism.
The absence of eects with geographical distance matrices shows that tax interactions can be triggered by shared institutions or media rather than by geographical distance only. Moreover, while counties, common administrations and media are valuable communication platforms and intensify tax interactions during the reform, voluntary project cooperation of municipalities is only slightly signicant.
29 Table A .2 in Appendix shows that also local interest groups and cooperation in regional marketing and tourism do not yield signicant interactions. Table A .3 in Appendix shows the robustness of selected weighting schemes. Administration and media weights prove to be widely robust and show similar eects as the county weights. Single project cooperation, however, yields only signicance at the 10% level and depends largely on the inclusion of control variables. Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights. All control variables are the same like in Table 1 . Neighboring tax rates are instrumented with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate signicance levels at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
Evidence on competing explanations for tax interactions
We provide suggestive evidence in this section that social interactions and not other competing motives are the reason for the observed tax mimicking instead. in the present context. Also Baskaran (2015a) does not nd signicant tax revenue or base eects of the reform in question. The timing of treatment eects is another reason against tax competition. We only nd short-term eects whereas tax competition for mobile resources can be expected to trigger a continuous tax game. We also rule out benet spillovers as we do not observe any negative tax interactions.
Another explanation for local tax interactions is (partial) coordination. While we do observe a strong role of counties in local policy making, active coordination through counties is unlikely as this implies a perfect harmonization of tax rates within a given county. However, business tax rates are still somewhat heterogeneous although they were synchronized substantially after the reform. There is no anecdotal evidence either that county executives dictate new tax rates for member communes. After all, counties also do not have legal tax autonomy. Therefore, counties and other institutions can be rather understood as a platform for local politicians or bureaucrats to communicate individual tax strategies. The eect of media does not seem to be voter driven as there are no dierences between municipalities with or without narrow majorities. Therefore, media could also work as a mere communication platform for politicians and bureaucrats themselves to pick up information which are not spread in other ways such as county parliaments, joint bureaucracies or other forms of inter-municipal cooperation. Therefore, not active but rather passive coordination in form of knowledge diusion seems to be in place.
Partial coordination is also unlikely to be present as it implies a repeated game structure and one would therefore expect to observe continuous tax interactions. However, tax interactions phase out quickly after the reform and have no eects on the tax base. Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights. Neighboring tax rates as well as the interactions are instrumented with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. All control variables are the same like in Table 1 . Majority always represents an interaction term with the neighboring tax rate, when a party in the council has more than x percent of the seats in the municipal council. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate signicance levels at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***). (Revelli, 2003) or France (Breuillé, Vigneron, and Anne-Laure, 2011 (Arnold, Boettcher, Freier, Geiÿler, and Holler, 2015) . Also its high average municipal size compared to other German states may imply that NRW municipalities are on average more professional in local policy making. The county weights reects the existing counties. All other weighting schemes are obtained from Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) and Terfrüchte (2015) . Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) use a more heuristic approach that observes whether dierent institutions within the same category share the same border. For each region, the authors plotted the radii of each institution on a map and aggregated municipalities to the regions, when they shared borders along these dierent institutions. Terfrüchte (2015) uses a functional approach where regional correlations between the institutions are used to construct regional action spaces. Whereas the approach by Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) is more oriented on existing borders, the approach by Terfrüchte (2015) is more functional. The rst approach maps the borders of existing institutions and aggregates these by common overlaps, whereas the second approach measures the related regional correlation of institutions and constructs regions from these correlations.
These action spaces are the basis for our weighting matrices in Table A .2. In certain institutional setups, some municipalities end up as islands, i.e. do not have any neighbors.
For simplicity, we assign these municipalities a zero for neighboring tax changes. Social and economic (functional) Industrial chamber of commerce and chamber of crafts districts, regional associations 14 (47) 37.55 0 (5) of political parties, districts of employers' associations and unions and districts of environmental associations
Regional marketing
Local tourist associations and regional marketing initiatives 14 43.01 0 Notes: Source: All institutional characteristics were obtained by Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) . Institutional setups with the sux functional are obtained from Terfrüchte (2015) .
